Public Key Cryptography: RSA and Lots of Number Theory



Public vs. Private-Key Cryptography

- We have just discussed traditional symmetric cryptography:
 - Uses a single key shared between sender and receiver
- Asymmetric (public key) cryptography was introduced by Diffie & Hellman and is a dramatically different approach to cryptography:
 - Two keys are used: a public and a private key
 - Alice generates a public and a private key
 - The Public Key is given to anyone who would like to securely communicate with Alice
 - Alice keeps the Private key "private" and she may decrypt messages encrypted with the public key
- Asymmetric cryptography is NOT a replacement of symmetric cryptography
 - There are many scenarios where symmetric is much better than asymmetric (such as bulk data encryption)



Public-Key Cryptography





Pros and Cons of Public Key Cryptography

- There are several advantages to public key cryptography:
 - Asymmetry allows for easier key distribution: We do not need a trusted third party (KDC) to distribute keys
 - Asymmetry provides proof of origin: The secret key is something that only one entity knows.
 - Can be extended to form chains of trust: Public Key Certificate frameworks provide a natural way to model trust.
- There are several disadvantages to public key cryptography:
 - Computation Burden: By its very nature, public key cryptography is not as fast or computationally efficient as symmetric cryptography.
 - **Communication Overhead:** PKIs typically require significant communication overhead (frequent and large messages).



Public-Key Characteristics

- Public-Key algorithms rely on two keys with the characteristics that it is:
 - computationally infeasible to find decryption key knowing only algorithm & encryption key
 - computationally easy to en/decrypt messages when the relevant (en/decrypt) key is known
 - either of the two related keys can be used for encryption, with the other used for decryption (in some schemes)



Public-Key Cryptosystems



Figure 9.4 Public-Key Cryptosystem: Secrecy and Authentication



RSA

- The RSA algorithm is the most popular public key scheme and was invented by Rivest, Shamir & Adleman of MIT in 1977
- Based on exponentiation in a finite field over integers modulo a prime
 - Exponentiation takes $O((\log n)^3)$ operations (easy)
 - Exponentiation is accomplished through repeated squaring
 - Uses large integer operations
- Requires finding large primes
- The security of RSA is based on the (believed) intractability of the factoring of the product of two large primes
 - Difficulty of factoring is based upon the size of the factors
 - Factorization of RSA composite takes $O(e^{\log n \log \log n})$ operations (hard)



Setup of RSA

- Alice wishes to generate a public key and a private key
- 1. She first generates two large random primes p and q
- 2. She computes the composite n=pq, and the Euler Phi function $\varphi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$
- 3. She chooses a random encryption exponent e such that $gcd(e, \varphi(n)) = 1$
- 4. She finds the decryption exponent by: $ed = 1 \mod \varphi(n)$
- Public key is {e,N}
- Private key is {d,p,q}



Encryption with RSA

- Suppose Bob wishes to encrypt a message M and send it to Alice.
- He acquires her public key {e,n}
- He computes the ciphertext:

$$c = m^e \mod n$$

• Alice can decrypt by using her private key {d,p,q} via

$$m = c^d \mod n$$

• Requirement: We are doing operations modulo n, so message must be smaller than m



RSA Example

- 1. Select primes: p=885320963 & q=238855417
- 2. Compute n = pq = 211463707796206571
- 3. Compute phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)
- 4. Select e: gcd(e, phi(n)) = 1; choose e = 9007
- 5. Determine d: de=1 mod phi(n) and d < phi(n). Value is d=116402471153538991

Example encryption

- 1. Suppose m=30120
- 2. Ciphertext c=m^e mod n = $(30120)^{9007}$ =113535859035722866
- 3. Reconstruct plaintext: $m=c^{d} \mod n$ = 113535859035722866 ¹¹⁶⁴⁰²⁴⁷¹¹⁵³⁵³⁸⁹⁹¹ = 30120



Why RSA Works

- OK... so we've covered what RSA is... now lets look at why it works, and how to make it work in practice.
- There are several key observations, most built from number theory, that we will need.
- We will cover the following:
 - Euler's Theorem
 - How to Calculate Inverses
 - Modular Exponentiation
 - Finding Primes
- We will briefly discuss the security of RSA today.
- More on the security of RSA will come in a lecture on attacks and cryptanalysis.



Euler's Theorem

- Fermat's Little Theorem: If p is a prime and p does not divide a, then a^{p-1} ≡ 1 (mod p).
- Euler's Theorem is a generalization of Fermat's Little Theorem
- Euler's Theorem: If gcd(a, n) = 1, then $a^{\phi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$.
- What is φ(n)? It's the amount of numbers between 1 and n that relatively prime to n.
- Example: $\phi(pq) = (p-1)(q-1)$
- Euler/Fermat Example: Compute 2⁴³²¹⁰ (mod 101).
- Solution: From Fermat's theorem, we know that $2^{100} \equiv 1 \pmod{101}$. Therefore, $2^{43210} \equiv (2^{100})^{432} 2^{10} \equiv 1^{432} 2^{10} \equiv 1024 \equiv 14 \pmod{101}$.



Why Does Euler Make RSA Work?

- Basic Principle: Let a, n, x, y be integers with n ≥ 1 and gcd(a, n) = 1. If x ≡ y (mod φ(n)), then a^x ≡ a^y (mod n). In other words, if you want to work mod n, you should work mod φ(n) in the exponent.
- In RSA, we choose $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$, so

 $m^{ed} \equiv m^1 \equiv m \pmod{n}$.

Or, more explicitly $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$ means

$$ed = 1 + k \phi(n)$$

So

$$m^{ed} \equiv m^{1+k\varphi(n)} \equiv m \pmod{n}$$



How to Calculate Inverses for RSA?

- We need to calculate e and d such that $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$. How do we do this?
- Step 1: Choose a random e such that gcd(e, φ(n)) =1.
 Why?

How?

• Step 2: Now, find d.

The wrong way:

 $e \cdot 1 \equiv e \mod \varphi(n)$ $e \cdot 2 \equiv 2e \mod \varphi(n)$ $e \cdot 3 \equiv 3e \mod \varphi(n)$ and so on... **The Correct Way:** Use Extended Euclidean Algorithm!



The Plain Euclidean Algorithm

- The (plain) Euclidean Algorithm finds the gcd(a,b):
- Example: gcd(1180, 482)

 $1180 = 2 \cdot 482 + 216$ $482 = 2 \cdot 216 + 50$ $216 = 4 \cdot 50 + 16$ $50 = 3 \cdot 16 + 2$ $16 = 8 \cdot 2 + 0$

• Last non-zero remainder is the gcd.



Plain Euclidean Algorithm, pg 2.

- Formally, the Euclidean algorithm for calculating gcd(a,b): Suppose that a>b
- Divide b into a: $a = q_1 b + r_1$
- If $r_1=0$ then b|a and gcd(a,b)=b else represent b by $b=q_2 r_1+r_2$
- 3. Continue in this way until remainder is zero. The gcd is last non-zero remainder.

$$a = q_{1} b + r_{1}$$

$$b = q_{2} r_{1} + r_{2}$$

$$r_{1} = q_{3} r_{2} + r_{3}$$

...

$$r_{k-2} = q_{k} r_{k-1} + r_{k}$$

$$r_{k-1} = q_{k+1} r_{k} + 0$$

$$gcd(a,b) = r_{k}$$



Getting closer to inverses...

- We can prove the following result using the Euclidean Algorithm:
- Theorem: Let a and b be two integers, with at least one of a, b nonzero, and let d = gcd(a, b). Then there exist integers x, y such that ax + by = d. In particular, if a and b are relatively prime, then there exist integers x, y with ax + by = 1.
- How do we use this? Suppose we know a, b, x, y as above. Then the inverse of a (mod b) is x.
- Why?
- So, we need to find these x and y!
- Euclidean algorithm will give us x and y, if we do bookkeeping!



Showing ax+by=gcd(a,b)

• The proof of the previous theorem just involves substitution. $r_1=a-q_1 b$ let $x_1=1$, $y_1=-q_1$, so $r_1=x_1 a + y_1 b$ Next step...

 $r_{2} = b - q_{2} r_{1}$ plug in earlier result $r_{2} = b - q_{2} (x_{1} a + y_{1} b) = -x_{1}q_{2} a + (b) (1 - y_{1} q_{2})$ let $x_{2} = -x_{1}q_{2}$, $y_{2} = (1 - y_{1} q_{2})$ So $r_{2} = x_{2} a + y_{2} b$

Follow this process repeatedly: If $r_i = x_i a + y_i b$

Then
$$r_{i+1} = r_{i-1} - q_{i+1} r_i$$
 = $x_{i-1} a + y_{i-1} b - q_{i+1} (x_i a + y_i b)$
= $a (x_{i-1} - q_{i+1} x_i) + b (y_{i-1} - q_{i+1} y_i)$
= $a x_{i+1} + b y_{i+1}$

Since this holds for any r_i , it holds for the last one $r_k = gcd(a,b)$.



Extended Euclidean Algorithm

• The idea in the proof leads to the Extended Euclidean Algorithm Input: a, b non-negative with a> b Output: d=gcd(a,b) and x and y such that ax+by=d

```
If b=0 {
   d=a; x=1; y=0; return(d,x,y); \}
x2=1; x1=0; y2=0; y1=1;
While b>0 {
   q=floor(a/b);
   r=a-q*b;
   x=x2-q*x1;
   y=y2-q*y1;
   a=b;
   b=r;
   x2=x1; x1=x;
   y2=y1; y1=y; }
d=a; x=x2; y=y2;
Return(d,x,y)
```



Implementation Detail: How to multiply fast!

- RSA needs calculations like m^e mod n. How do can we do this quickly?
- If we just do sequential multiplication, it will take forever! (Remember, n is on the order of 1000 bits!!! And so is e!!!)
- To do it effectively, we use **Repeated Squaring**:
- **Example:** Let's do $2^{1234} \pmod{789}$

 $2^4 \equiv 4^2 \equiv 16$ $2^8 \equiv 16^2 \equiv 256$ $2^{16} \equiv 256^2 \equiv 49$ $2^{32} \equiv 34$ $2^{64} \equiv 367$ $2^{128} \equiv 559$ $2^{256} \equiv 37$ $2^{512} \equiv 580$ $2^{1024} \equiv 286$.

• Since 1234 = 1024 + 128 + 64 + 16 + 2 (1234 = 10011010010 in binary), thus

 $2^{1234} \equiv 286 \cdot 559 \cdot 367 \cdot 49 \cdot 4 \equiv 481 \pmod{789}$.



Making Primes, Principles pg. 1

- Basic Principle: Let n be an integer and suppose there exist integers x and y with x² ≡ y² (mod n), but x !≡ ±y (mod n). Then n is composite. Moreover, gcd(x y, n) gives a nontrivial factor of n.
- **Proof.** Let d = gcd(x y, n). If d = n then $x \equiv y \pmod{n}$, which is assumed not to happen.

Suppose d = 1. We know that if a | bc and gcd(a, b) = 1, then a | c.

- In our case, since n divides $x^2 y^2 = (x-y)(x+y)$ and d = 1, we must have that n divides x + y, which contradicts the assumption that $x !\equiv -y \pmod{n}$. Therefore, d is not = 1, n, so d is a nontrivial factor of n.
- **Example:** Since $12^2 \equiv 2^2 \pmod{35}$, but $12 \not\equiv \pm 2 \pmod{35}$, we know that 35 is composite. Moreover, gcd(12 2, 35) = 5 is a nontrivial factor of 35.



Making Primes, Principles pg. 2

- We may use Fermat's Little Theorem to prove numbers are **not** prime.
- Here's the way: Suppose you have a number n and want to show it is not prime. Choose a number a, and calculate

 $a^{n-1} \pmod{n}$

If this does not equal 1, then n cannot be prime.

Why?

• Example: Show 35 is not prime.

$$2^{34} = 2^{32} 2^2 = 11 * 4 = 9 != 1 \pmod{35}$$

Hence 35 is not prime.

- But, what if $a^{n-1} \pmod{n} = 1$? This does not mean n is prime.
- Numbers n such that aⁿ⁻¹ (mod n)=1 for a particular a are said to be *pseudoprimes base a*. "a" is said to be a *liar* for n.



Making Primes, Miller-Rabin pg. 1

- <u>Fact</u>: Let n be an odd prime and let $n-1=2^{s}r$, where r is odd. Let a be any integer such that gcd(a,n)=1. Then either $a^{r} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ or $a^{2^{j}r} \equiv -1 \pmod{n}$ for some $0 \le j \le s-1$.
- <u>Definition</u>: Let n be an odd composite with $n-1=2^{s}r$. Let $a \in [1,n-1]$. If either $a^{r} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ or $a^{2^{j}r} \equiv -1 \pmod{n}$, for some $0 \le j \le s-1$ then n is a strong <u>pseudoprime</u> base a, and a is a strong liar for n.
- <u>Fact</u>: If n is an odd composite integer, then at most 1/4 of the numbers a are strong liars for n.
- We can use this in a Monte-Carlo algorithm to produce "primes":
 - Test t different a's.
 - Probability of falsely identifying a prime is $\leq \left(\frac{1}{4}\right)^t$



Miller-Rabin Primality Test, pg. 2

• Generate a random (odd) integer n such that $n-1 = 2^{s}r$

```
For k=1 to t do
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Choose a random integer 2 \le a \le n-2
   Calculate y=a^r \pmod{n}
  If ((y!=1) \& (y!=n-1)) then
       j=1;
        While ( (j \le s-1) \& (y \le n-1) ) do
               y=y^2 \pmod{n}
                If y=1 then Return("Composite");
               i++;
        enddo
        If (y != n-1) then Return("Composite");
   endif
endfor
```

```
Return("Probably Prime");
```



OK, we know how to make primes... Now what?

- Not all primes are good... There are some things we should check for when choosing primes...
- Make certain (p-1) or (q-1) do not have many small factors!

Why? Else, the (p-1)-Factorization Method will make n easy to factor

• Make p and q of different lengths

Why? The following result applies...

- **Theorem:** Suppose p and q are primes with $q . Let n=pq, and choose e and d as in the RSA algorithm. If <math>d < (1/3)n^{1/4}$, then d can be calculated quickly.
- Make certain adversary doesn't know many of the digits of p or q. Why? The following result applies...

Theorem: Let n=pq have m digits. If we know the first m/4 or the last m/4 digits of p then we can efficiently factor n.



A Little on the Security of RSA

- The security of RSA is based upon the assumption that factoring the product of two large primes is **hard**.
- What if we assume factoring is impossible, then what are the logical implications?
- Most arguments go like this:
 - If factoring is hard, and XYZ is directly related to factoring, then XYZ is hard.
 - Or, say it another way... Assume XYZ is easy, then show XYZ is equivalent to factoring, which contradicts the fact that factoring is impossible!



An Example of this Principle

- Suppose Eve sees n and e (they're public!!!). We claim she can't figure out φ(n).
- **Proof:** We show that knowing n and $\varphi(n)$ is equivalent to factoring, i.e. finding p and q !

p and q are the roots of $(x-p)(x-q) = x^2-(p+q)x + pq$.

Note that $n-\phi(n)+1 = pq - (p-1)(q-1) + 1 = p+q$

So
$$(x-p)(x-q) = x^2 - (n-\phi(n)+1)x + n$$

We can solve this using quadratic formula...

p,q=
$$\frac{(n-\phi(n)+1)\pm\sqrt{(n-\phi(n)+1)^2-4n}}{(n-\phi(n)+1)^2-4n}$$

So, if we could find $\varphi(n)$ we would be able to factor n!!!

• This removes the **easy** way to find d by finding $\varphi(n)$.



Factorization and Fermat Factorization

• Modern factorization methods involve significant mathematical machinery. However, we may use a simple factoring method to see what not to do when setting up RSA

Fermat Factorization:

Start with n=pq. We try to write $n=x^2 - y^2 = (x+y)(x-y)$ Can we even do this? Yes, always! Let p=x+y and q = x-yx+y = px-y = q(x+y = p)x-y = q(x+y = q)(x-y = q)(x-y = q)(x-y = q)(y=(p-q)/2)

So this is always possible. Now, try $n+1^2$, $n+2^2$, $n+3^2$, ... until we find a square If $n+y^2 = x^2$ then we are done! $n=x^2 - y^2$

• This method only works well when (x+y) and (x-y) are close! That is, when p and q are close! So, we must **not** choose p and q too close.

